Carter-Initiative 2008
Im April 2008 reiste Jimmy Carter in den Nahen Osten und konferierte mit der Hamas, um deren Bereitschaft auszuloten, wie es zu einem israelisch-palästinensischen Friedensvertrag kommen könnte.
Im Ergebnis der Gespräche erklärte Carter, dass sich die Hamas-Führung einem zwischen Israel und Abbas auszuhandelndem Friedensvertrag nicht widersetzen werde, sofern es darin um ein Israel in den Grenzen von 1967 gehe und das Vertragswerk in einer palästinensischen Volksabstimmung befürwortet werde.
Dieses Gesprächsergebnis wäre ein Meilenstein auf dem Weg zum Frieden. Wer nun noch immer den diplomatischen Verkehr und Verhandlungen mit der Hamas verweigert, weil sie dem Staat Israel die Anerkennung verweigere, will einfach nicht die dazu erforderlichen Schritte gehen, sondern die Geschicke militärisch diktieren, den Gesichtsverlust der Hamas und letztlich auch der Palästinenser, so schlecht sie auch immer von der Hamas vertreten sein mögen.
-markus rabanus- 21.04.05
DOKUMENTATION
Preliminary Report on the Middle
East:
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter
21 April 2008
This report was delivered in
Jerusalem by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to the Israel Council on Foreign
Relations.
I want to thank David Kimche and the Israel: Council
on Foreign Relations for this opportunity to summarize the preliminary findings
of the Carter Center delegation's study mission to the Middle East.
During the past eight days, we travelled to Israel, the West Bank, Egypt, Syria,
Saudi Arabia, and Jordan and met with leaders of each nation – from government,
business, academia, and civil society. We met with very
distinguished leaders in Israel and Palestine, as well as in other countries and
learned a great deal from them. We visited the Hadassah Hospital in
Jerusalem and a hospital in Ashkelon where we saw Israeli and Palestinian
doctors treating patients from Israel and Palestine – a positive sign of what
the future could hold if peace is achieved.
We knew that some of our meetings –
particularly with Hamas and the Syrian government – would be viewed negatively
in some quarters. Our intention was to obtain a clear view of the many
sides of the Middle East conflict. We believe that the problem is
not that we met them, but that the U.S. and Israeli governments refuse to meet
with them. This unwillingness to talk makes peace harder to
achieve.
In Israel, we visited Sderot and Ashkelon and saw, first hand, the despair and
fear due to the barrage of rockets. Aiming these rockets at
civilian communities is an act of terrorism, and we urged Hamas to stop.
I also visited the Palestinian territories and spoken to families who have lost
their loved ones. We met with men and women who have been imprisoned and
others who cannot go to work because the wall separates them from home to
workplace. This too is unacceptable.
On this 60th anniversary of the independence of
Israel, I acknowledge a personal sadness that, since Camp David, only one other
country in the region – Jordan –recognized Israel. I am glad
that President Bush and Secretary Rice have committed themselves to completing a
peace agreement by the end of the year. I hope that occurs and that
such an agreement will set the stage for wider recognition of Israel, and
acceptance of a sovereign Palestinian state. Our talks in Syria have
led us to conclude that peace with Israel could be within reach, and Syria could
be the next country to recognize Israel if an agreement can be reached between
them.
Allow us to offer some tentative conclusions based on our many meetings.
We did not come as mediators or negotiators, and
have no interest in interfering in the principal peace negotiations. But
we did think there might be a role in listening closely to two key actors –
Hamas and the Syrian Government – and offering ideas on ways that they could
take a more productive road to peace. Our conclusion is that there
are good reasons to believe that such a strategy can yield constructive
involvement by them, but it will take considerable time and patience.
Let me focus my remarks on the two most controversial sets of meetings.
Hamas. I understand why Israel
and other governments are reluctant to engage Hamas. They have not agreed
to recognize Israel; they have not renounced violence; and they do not accept
previous peace agreements. In our judgment, Hamas should accept all three
points, but we do not believe peace is likely, and we are certain peace is
not sustainable unless a way can be found to ensure that Hamas will not disrupt
the peace negotiations.
The current strategy isolating and suppressing
Hamas is not working. It only exacerbates the cycle of violence.
Some feel that my meeting with Hamas legitimized them, but a plurality of the
Palestinian people voted for them in the 2006 elections, which I observed and a
poll of Israeli citizens indicates strong support for Israel-Hammas talks.
We have no illusions that one meeting will stop
the violence or produce peace, but we need to take that first step.
It is clear from our conversations that their views, as well as those of
Israelis, need to be tested by regular exchanges, such as occurred in the many
years of Track II diplomacy with the PLO.
Violence freezes adversaries in a counterproductive posture.
Israelis think the Palestinians will never accept Israel, and Palestinians
believe that Israel will never accept a genuinely independent Palestine.
We think both are wrong and trust Prime Minister Olmert and President Abbas to
find their path to a two-state solution.
I met with Hamas leaders from the West Bank, Gaza, and Damascus.
They said that they would accept a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders if
approved by Palestinians – a departure from long-standing Hamas doctrine that
refused to recognize two states. So this is one change.
Specifically, they agreed to the following: "If President Abbas
succeeds in negotiating a final status agreement with Israel, Hamas will accept
the decision made by the Palestinian people and their will through a referendum
monitored by international observers, including those from the Carter Center, or
by a newly elected Palestinian National Council by mechanisms agreed upon
nationally, even if Hamas is opposed to the agreement. In order to ensure
that the referendum can be debated and the choice by voters truly reflects the
will of the Palestinian people, a national reconciliation and, in particular,
between Fatah and Hamas will be necessary.
Let me underscore the significance of the statement. It means that
Hamas will not undermine Abbas' efforts to negotiate the agreement, and whatever
position Hamas chooses to take on the agreement, Hamas will accept an agreement
if the Palestinian people support it by a free vote. If the
agreement calls for a two-state solution and the recognition of Israel and
Palestine, Hamas will, in effect, recognize Israel, if the people agree on the
plan.
Hamas leaders said they did not want violence, but they believed it was
necessary to end the occupation. However, they did say they would
consider alternative strategies, including non-violence, to achieve their goal
of a sovereign Palestinian state.
In our meetings with Hamas, we made the following additional points:
Syria. Communications
between Israel and the United States with Syria has been minimal, and relations
have been strained when not hostile. The United States and Israel
view Syria as a supporter of terrorism through its cooperation with Iran and its
funding and support for Hamas and Hezbollah. Furthermore, the two
governments view Syria as undermining the stability of Lebanon and the selection
of a President. In our conversations, the Syrian government seemed
determined to change. Senior government officials pledged to complete an
agreement on the Golan Heights and peace with Israel as soon as possible.
The government took very seriously the recent comment by Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert that he understood Syrian expectations, and he thought Syria understood
Israeli expectations. Since the Syrian government considers that
about 85 percent of the issues have been resolved in prior negotiations, it
believes the agreement should be completed soon. In Syria's view, there
has been agreement on the borders, riparian rights as they apply to the Sea of
Gallilee, security zones and the presence of international forces.
The United States has three options. It can oppose such talks, and that
will make it impossible to achieve peace. It can play a neutral role,
but that won't be enough. Finally, the U.S. could play a positive and
constructive role, as proposed by the Syrian government, and we hope it does.
On Lebanon, Syria insists that it is no longer playing a large role as it did
when it had troops there, and that the key to the solution is a national
dialogue in which the various parties reach a consensus. In effect, this
means that on critical issues (constitutional, economic policy, security), the
government should obtain the agreement of Hezbollah.
In brief, Syria has influence over four of the
conflicts that we have been discussing: Syria-Israel; Israel-Palestine;
Intra-Palestine; and Lebanon. A successful negotiation on each will
have positive effects on the other, and conversely, failure to reach agreement
on one would make it harder to solve problems tomorrow. If there is an
agreement between Israel and Palestine and reconciliation between Fateh and
Hamas, then there is no longer any need for Syria to help Hamas; and if there is
a consensus on Lebanon, there is no need to support Hezbollah. And finally,
if the United States decides to support the negotiations with Israel, then U.S.
concerns with Syria's performance will be addressed.
In Syria, we raised our concerns about the people imprisoned for signing the
Damascus Declaration, and President Bashar al-Assad said that there were only 7
left from the original 90 detained. He said that if they sought
clemency, they would receive it. We also asked him about Guy Hever, the
young Israeli soldier who has been missing since August 1997, and he said they
had no evidence of his whereabouts. We asked about Ehud Goldwasser and
Eldad Regev who were captured by Hezbollah at the beginning of the war.
The Syrian government has no information on them.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we agree with President Abbas'
recent statement that the final status negotiations are moving so slowly, with
so few obvious results, that it is very unlikely negotiations will be completed
by the deadline at the end of the year. This conclusion is widely
shared, and may prove to be tragic. The combination of little or no
progress on final status issues and a regression on the roadmap issues –
settlements, checkpoints, etc. – and the closure of Gaza – all this means
that the frustration level among Palestinians may be reaching the boiling
point.
Therefore, it is essential that we find an alternative and that includes a
ceasefire, exchange of prisoners, negotiations between Israel and Syria and some
rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas.
No important achievement has ever occurred in the Middle East without taking a
risk. I hope the Israeli government, the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, and
the U.S. government are prepared to take risks for peace. The
transformation of Israel in sixty years is truly a miracle to behold.
The next miracle for which we should all pray is the establishment of a
sovereign Palestinian state that will live in peace with Israel and will
cooperate with all their neighbors for the future of the region and its children.
Quelle und mehr >> www.cartercenter.org/news/trip_reports/preliminary_report_middle_east_042108.html